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Anarchism, Violence and the
Representational Impulse
Dan Colson
Anarchism literally exploded onto the American political scene on May 4, 
1886, with the now famous Haymarket riot. A relatively commonplace labor 
rally in Chicago began to break up as rain clouds rolled in. As the crowd was 
dispersing and the day’s final speaker—an anarchist—was concluding, police 
moved to end the meeting prematurely. A skirmish ensued, a bomb was thrown 
into a group of police officers, and they opened fire: soon, numerous civilians 
and officers were dead. Suddenly everyone was talking about anarchism. The 
Haymarket affair has dominated critical attention to pre–World War II Ameri-
can anarchism, a focus that signals the convergence of popular caricature—the 
bomb-wielding anarchist depicted in countless newspapers from the 1880s to 
the present—with scholarship. The highly visible moment of anarchist violence 
produced an historical conflation, an elision of anarchism’s internal conflicts, 
the near synonymy of “anarchism” with “violence.” This essay seeks not to 
sever anarchism from violence, but to explore a far more complex relationship 
between the two by detailing the ambivalent, fractured, contradictory relation-
ship between late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century American anarchism 
and anarchist violence—between propaganda and the deed.
Most examinations of anarchist violence rely on the appellation “propa-
ganda by deed,” a construction that itself suggests a tension between words 
(propaganda) and actions (deeds). This tension, however, is not simply rhetori-
cal; it’s also historical: anarchists inconsistently endorsed violence. In fact, the 
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anarchist rhetoric surrounding violence evinces tension between their orienta-
tion to theoretical violence and their response to actual violence, a fracture of-
ten characterized by a strong logical defense of violence and an equally potent 
aversion to violent acts. At other times it appears merely as an inconsistent 
appeal to violence’s validity as a political tactic. This essay explores the anar-
chist inconsistency—an historical ambivalence toward violence—to reevaluate 
anarchism’s relationship to violence and thus to reconsider the link between 
propaganda and the (violent) deed.
Foregrounding two anarchists—Emma Goldman and Alexander Berk-
man—and two moments of anarchist violence—Berkman’s 1892 attempt to kill 
industrialist Henry Clay Frick and Leon Czolgosz’s 1901 assassination of U.S. 
president William McKinley—I elucidate a fundamental anarchist ambivalence 
toward violence, then posit an explanation for this tension. First, I discuss ef-
forts to theorize the relationship of American anarchism to representation, ad-
dressing the philosophical links between democracy and propaganda. Next, I 
explain the philosophy of “propaganda by deed,” a theoretical stance toward the 
potential value of violence. Then, I outline Goldman’s and Berkman’s specific 
orientation to propaganda by deed and its violent rhetoric before turning to 
their responses to real instances of violence. I argue that these multiple forms of 
ambivalence all emerge from the complex interstices of registers of representa-
tion: on one hand, anarchists actively rejected representative democracy; on the 
other hand, they were surprisingly willing to represent their politics (to produce 
propaganda). The ambivalence appears because these two forms of representa-
tion are not fully distinct—there exists a consonance between representative 
democracy and other forms of representation that forced anarchist violence it-
self to become propaganda. Ultimately, then, anarchists’ ambivalence was an 
at times strategic, at times unconscious, effort to represent their radical politics 
within the American political sphere.
Registers of Representation
The question of anarchists’ relationship to representation has been asked 
since the origins of American anarchism. In the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries, global politics struggled with multiple autocratic and totalitarian 
nations, alongside monarchies and varyingly successful forms of democracy. 
These disparate governmental forms produced a wide range of anarchist reac-
tions, many of which address local or national concerns—the concrete forms 
of government against which individual anarchists react.1 As Voltairine de 
Cleyre—one of the period’s most prominent anarchists—pointed out, “anar-
chism is concerned with present conditions,” with specific “oppressions,” so 
anarchists tend to critique the instantiation of government under which they 
live.2 Therefore, any study of American anarchism will find that it “is associ-
ated primarily with a rejection of representative democracy.”3 This rejection 
of political representation dates back at least to Mikhail Bakunin, who argued 
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that “the whole system of representative government is an immense fraud.”4 As 
philosopher Brian Seitz contends, democracy and representation “have become 
inseparable from each other, an inseparability not of logic but of historical con-
tingency”: democracy need not be representative, but historically—and in the 
United States—it has been so.5 Intellectual historian F. R. Ankersmit further ar-
gues that “without representation there is no represented—and without political 
representation there is no nation as a truly political entity. . . . Political reality 
only comes into being after the nation has unfolded itself in a represented and in 
a representation representing the represented. Without representation, no demo-
cratic politics.”6 Put simply, representation is the mechanism through which the 
nation is constructed, so it’s no wonder the American anarchists reject it: they 
critique representative democracy because it structures and sustains U.S. state 
government.7
Recently, however, scholars have interrogated the relationship of anarchism 
to representation more broadly. Todd May, for instance, claims “the critique of 
representation in the anarchist tradition runs deeper than just political repre-
sentation. . . . Representation, in the anarchist tradition, must be understood 
not merely in its political connotations, but more widely.”8 Here May weds 
the anarchist rejection of democratic representation to poststructural critiques 
of representation/signification to define a “type of anarchism characterized by 
its ‘wariness about representation.’”9 Positing an historical link, May suggests 
that anarchists—like post-structuralist critics—were wary of representation far 
beyond their rejection of representative democracy.
Jesse S. Cohn expresses skepticism about this overly neat conflation of 
representational registers, questioning the “translation of an anarchist refusal of 
political representation into a generalized ‘resistance to representation.’”10 He 
rightly asks “is it true, historically speaking, that anarchism has always rejected 
representation in all its forms . . . or is it possible for anarchists to distinguish 
between legitimate and illegitimate representational practices?”11 Whereas 
Cohn seeks to recuperate the possibilities for anarchist representation, I see in 
his response to May a yet unresolved tension. Yes, anarchist “opposition to rep-
resentation was incomplete and inconsistent.”12 But this inconsistency indicates 
neither a wholesale rejection of representation nor a willing embrace. Rather, 
May and Cohn together elucidate the problem representation has presented for 
anarchists since Haymarket.
This problem emerges, I argue, from the philosophical similarity of repre-
sentational registers: representative democracy and other forms of representa-
tion share a core. Hanna Fenichel Pitkin argues that representation—in all of its 
forms—is a unified philosophical concept:
Representation does have an identifiable meaning, applied 
in different but controlled and discoverable ways in differ-
ent contexts. It is not vague and shifting, but a single, highly 
complex concept. . . . There is . . . no great difficulty about 
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formulating a one-sentence definition of this basic meaning, 
broad enough to cover all its applications in different con-
texts. . . . [R]epresentation means, as the word’s etymological 
origins indicate, re-presentation, a making present again. . . . 
[R]epresentation, taken generally, means the making present 
in some sense of something which is nevertheless not present 
literally or in fact.13
Pitkin’s definition applies to all representation, from politics to basic signi-
fication. So, just as representational government calls the nation into being by 
“re-presenting” its collective will, propaganda re-presents political philosophy. 
This basic consonance certainly does not make representative democracy and 
propaganda identical. It does, though, gesture toward a complex connection 
between registers of political representation.
I have written elsewhere about a “logic of representation” in the United 
States during the height of American anarchism, an “impulse for Americans to 
represent and to be represented.”14 Within this overdetermining representational 
logic, we find two registers of representation converging in the political arena: 
democratic representation and propaganda (i.e., representing political posi-
tions). Anarchist violence frequently was directed at the former but also chal-
lenged the latter: it was not merely the utterance of political positions and thus 
appeared as anti-representational in multiple ways. The ambivalence toward 
this violence, however, reveals the problem of representation for anarchists: 
if democratic representation and propaganda are philosophically similar—that 
is, that they both re-present a political will—it would be difficult to reject one 
without rejecting the other. Obviously, it’s not impossible (many anarchists 
openly embraced propaganda and similar forms of representation), but this ten-
sion helps explain the unsatisfactory theorizations of the relationship between 
anarchism and representation and, as I argue here, explains the anarchist am-
bivalence toward violence as the residue of their efforts to navigate a political 
arena structured by the impulse toward representation.15
Emma Goldman and Propaganda by Deed
To understand anarchism’s relationship to violence, we must begin with 
one of its broadest concepts: direct action.16 Late-nineteenth- and early-twen-
tieth-century anarchists rejected mechanisms for change that were structured 
by government, eschewing voting and similar overtly political methods for so-
cial transformation.17 Built upon the general assumption that laws were tools 
of oppression and the specifically American charge that majorities used repre-
sentative democracy to oppress, direct action stood in contrast to the systemic 
reduction of all political action to those techniques sanctioned by government 
(namely voting).18 Anarchists straightforwardly rejected not just government, 
but the uniquely American forms of political representation, signaling—as I 
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argue throughout this essay—the root of anarchists’ inconsistent stance toward 
violence: anarchists attempted to challenge U.S. representative government, 
but forms of political representation—democratic participation and propaganda 
itself—are not easily detached: each adheres to the basic impulse to re-present 
political will. Anarchists were forced to re-present their ideologies even as they 
rejected the representation at the heart of American democracy.
As de Cleyre pointed out, almost no one rejected direct action outright: 
“The majority of thinking people are really opportunist, leaning, some perhaps 
more to directness, some more to indirectness as a general thing, but ready to 
use either means when opportunity calls for it.”19 She argued that those who ac-
cepted political action did not reject direct action, but that anarchists must, by 
definition, rely solely on direct action, because “the basis of all political action 
is coercion; even when the State does good things, it finally rests on a club, a 
gun, or a prison, for its power to carry them through.”20 Put bluntly, direct ac-
tion was the political modality of the era’s anarchist theory. While the theory 
and practice of direct action were responsible indirectly for anarchism’s violent 
reputation, they did not necessarily imply or deploy violence. Theorists of pro-
paganda by deed—a type of direct action—however, did entertain the possibil-
ity of violent action to effect political change.
The concept of propaganda by deed emerged in the 1870s and can be most 
“directly traced to Bakunin who . . . declared: ‘Now we all have to embark 
together on the revolutionary ocean, and henceforth spread our principles no 
longer by words but by deed.’”21 Errico Malatesta frequently is attributed with 
coining the phrase and helped to define it in 1873. He and Carlo Cafiero claimed 
that “the insurrectional fact, destined to affirm socialist principles by deeds, 
is the most effective means of propaganda and the only one which, without 
tricking and corrupting the masses, can penetrate the deepest social layers and 
draw the living forces of humanity into the struggle.”22 Here Malatesta and 
Cafiero did not espouse violence directly, but gestured toward insurrection or 
revolution as a logical, factual possibility. Their version of direct action moved 
beyond passive methods of resistance: all propaganda by deed might be direct 
action, but not all direct action was propaganda by deed. Cafiero went further, 
asserting that “our action must be permanent rebellion, by word, by writing, 
by dagger, by gun, by dynamite.”23 Similarly, Paul Brousse—the major French 
proponent of propaganda by deed—advocated “fight[ing] back, defend[ing] 
oneself” violently if necessary.24
For Malatesta, Cafiero, and other anarchists, the value of deeds was found 
in propaganda: insurrectional acts would inspire others to join “the struggle.” 
They valued the violent act for its symbolic and inspirational value: the goal 
was propaganda; the deed was merely the mechanism. Peter Kropotkin, on the 
other hand, asserted that the “propaganda effect . . . is not . . . the primary mo-
tive for involvement in an act of revolt,” because “an act of revolt should be a 
serious act of war—not a dramatic gesture.”25 Kropotkin was one of the most 
important influences on American anarchism, and he insisted that propaganda 
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by deed was a bit of a misnomer: “when individuals, outraged by the system, at-
tempted to take the life of a man, they did so because he was a viper whom they 
hated—not because they wanted to make propaganda.”26 Clearly, propaganda 
by deed was not a unified theory—international anarchists debated it through-
out the period and even those who espoused it shifted positions over time—but 
an ongoing conversation that American anarchists entered into from the 1880s 
to the 1910s.27
This context was made even more complex by Haymarket, because many 
American radicals turned to anarchism as a direct result of the violence in 
Chicago. Emma Goldman, the most famous American anarchist, for instance, 
“marked her political transformation [at] the chilling moment when she became 
aware of the horror and significance of the death of the Haymarket anarchists.”28 
Upon hearing Johanna Greie speak of the “innocent blood of the Haymarket 
martyrs calling for revenge,” Goldman was forced to reconcile Greie’s radi-
cal position with the press’s pejorative description of the men as “anarchists, 
bomb-throwers.”29 Out of this disconnect, she came to learn about anarchism 
and, upon hearing of the Haymarket martyrs’ execution, found “a great ideal, a 
burning faith, a determination to dedicate myself to the memory of my martyred 
comrades, to make their cause my own.”30
Anarchism existed in the United States before 1886, but Haymarket, “for 
the first time . . . brought anarchism to the attention of the general public, identi-
fying it with terrorist violence and inspiring a horror of its teaching and practic-
es.”31 Haymarket marked a turning point, the moment when anarchism became 
a force in American political discourse. The height of American anarchism, 
then, was always accompanied by the specter of actual violence: Goldman and 
others had not only to address the continued disagreement about violence’s use-
fulness, but also to respond to acts of violence committed by or attributed to 
anarchists. Thus, it is vital to recognize a causal relationship: violence circulat-
ing around anarchists inspired new anarchists who in turn theorized violence 
and responded to later violent acts.
From her beginnings in the movement, Goldman was associated with the 
violent wing of anarchism. Johann Most—perhaps the most vocal advocate of 
propaganda by deed in the United States near the end of the nineteenth centu-
ry—was one of her “earliest mentors,” and her initial stance toward “propagan-
da by . . . deed bore the important influence of Kropotkin.”32 During the 1890s, 
Goldman was often reported to be advocating violence and, despite newspaper 
embellishment, it seems she did promote some form of propaganda by dead. 
For instance, she supported forcible expropriation: “You demand bread, and 
if you cannot acquire it through peaceful means you will get it by force.”33 
Goldman at times praised violence, noting that anarchist Gaetano Bresci’s as-
sassination of Italy’s King Umberto was a “good and noble, grand and useful” 
act designed to “free mankind from tyranny.”34 Yet, less than three years earlier 
she denounced the anarchist who killed Empress Elizabeth of Austria: “Even if 
this man Luccheni declared himself an Anarchist, I would be the first one to say 
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he is not one. Any man who understands the philosophy of anarchy could never 
commit such folly. The philosophy of anarchy forbids the destruction of hu-
man life.”35 Goldman sometimes expressed admiration for anarchist violence, 
other times denounced it; spoke of the value of force, then tempered the claim. 
Some scholars read in these disparate stances a chronological shift—seen most 
profoundly around 1901—in Goldman’s position on violence’s potential and in 
her “manner of addressing” it.36 I argue, however, that Goldman does not shift 
so much as she is conflicted; she evinces ambivalence toward violence, using 
violent rhetoric and the rhetoric of violence, while questioning violence’s ef-
fectiveness and looking to its logical causation rather than its position within 
anarchism. This seeming vacillation, of course, is partly strategic: she sought 
to retain violence’s rhetorical power while distancing anarchism from actual 
violence. “The Psychology of Political Violence” exemplifies this strategy.
First delivered as a lecture in 1909, then published as part of Anarchism and 
Other Essays in 1910, “The Psychology of Political Violence” was Goldman’s 
longest sustained attempt to theorize the relationships between government, 
anarchism, and violence. In it, she claimed that acts of political violence were 
produced “by the tremendous pressure of conditions, making life unbearable to 
[some] sensitive natures.”37 For Goldman, “the wholesale violence of capital 
and government [prompted] political acts of violence”: government is violence 
and any concomitant anti-government acts “are but a drop in the ocean.”38 Here 
Goldman was willing to absolve those who committed political violence by 
explaining the logical causation of their acts, but she stopped short of embrac-
ing those acts as valid forms of direct action.39 She distanced anarchism from 
violence first by suggesting that “a great number of acts, for which Anarchists 
had to suffer, either originated with the capitalist press or were instigated, if not 
directly perpetrated, by the police.”40 She may very well have been correct, but 
she added that even those “acknowledged Anarchists [who] committed acts of 
violence . . . were not impelled by the teachings of Anarchism.”41 Finally, she 
returned to the logical, psychological cause of violence, positing that the acts 
could not be measured in terms of the practical fight against government: “the 
question . . . is not whether [violent] acts were practical, any more than whether 
the thunderstorm is practical.”42
Each of these moves separated the act of violence from anarchism. Either 
the acts were not committed by anarchists or the acts were committed by anar-
chists, yet not in the spirit of anarchism, because the violence of government 
produced violent reactions that could not properly be called anarchist. At the 
beginning of “The Psychology of Political Violence,” Goldman quoted Alvin F. 
Sampson to clarify the link between government and violence:
[Violent acts] have, from time immemorial, been the reply of 
goaded and desperate classes, and goaded and desperate in-
dividuals, to wrongs from their fellowmen, which they felt to 
be intolerable. Such acts are the violent recoil from violence. 
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. . . The guilt of these acts lies upon every man and woman 
who . . . helps to keep up social conditions that drive human 
beings to despair.43
For Goldman, the primary source of these “social conditions” was gov-
ernment’s existence, a form of violence perpetually reproduced by democratic 
participation. She suggested, then, that government was the necessary and suf-
ficient cause for violence: its presence explained reactive violence, and these 
acts in turn demonstrated government’s continued effect. She insulated anar-
chism by collapsing government and violence into a cause-effect loop, yet she 
never reduced violence to government: all government was violence, but not all 
violence was government. In this space remained the anarchist ambivalence I 
detail throughout this essay.
As the most visible anarchist figure in the United States for several de-
cades, Goldman played a large role in shaping the movement’s public image, 
but her work does not reveal full support for or absolute rejection of violence as 
political strategy. Rather, she seemed alternatingly strategic and genuinely torn, 
yet persistently inconclusive: she used the rhetoric of violence and was sur-
rounded by violence attributed to her and her friends, yet the appearance of con-
sequential violence led her to pull back. Her inconsistency certainly contains a 
measure of self-interest: periodically eschewing violence helped her avoid pris-
on and resisted the caricature of the bomb-wielding terrorist. Self-preservation 
alone, though, is insufficient to explain the scope of her ambivalence. I argue, 
therefore, that Goldman’s ambivalence was structured by her efforts to navigate 
the overlap of representational registers—to simultaneously challenge one form 
of representation while relying on another.
The period’s anarchists rejected U.S. representative government, argu-
ing that it was inherently violent. They thus had to allow for the possibility of 
violent reaction. But, at the same time, they must represent this violence—and 
hence re-present a political position—to have any meaning. As I noted above, 
American democracy was structured as representation; the historically insepa-
rable combination of democracy and representation produced and sustained the 
nation as a political entity. The political sphere thus comprised a competing 
field of representations—efforts to present political visions (and political will) 
to reform or reshape the nation. Without representing the violence, it could not 
appear as politics in the American arena, because acts of violence were them-
selves interpreted as meaningless, random, and/or terroristic. That is, they did 
not re-present a coherent, recognizable political force that could be interpolated 
into U.S. democracy: both democratic participation (e.g., voting) and political 
rhetoric (i.e., propaganda) adhered to the representational impulse, while vio-
lence, as such, remained beyond it.
Much straightforward anarchist propaganda (propaganda by word) pro-
posed violence. It operated through rhetoric, a form that made sense within 
American political discourse: espousing a position, even a radical one, was 
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logically consonant with U.S. governance. Actual anarchist violence, however, 
could not be part of American governance or the surrounding political dis-
course: it was outside the scope of “politics.” Thus, anarchist propaganda sug-
gested violent deeds a priori, but rejected them a posteriori, because the rhetoric 
of violence fit within the political sphere while violence itself did not. Accord-
ing to anarchists like Goldman, government produced violence; Goldman’s 
writings show that the political need to represent (within U.S. democracy’s 
market of ideas) also produced anarchists’ fraught representations of violence. 
The anarchist ambivalence, then, reflects a paradox of sorts: to appear as poli-
tics, propaganda by deed must be propaganda without deeds. The full measure 
of this paradox is perhaps best seen in Alexander Berkman—Emma Goldman’s 
longtime friend, co-conspirator, and lover—his writing, and his violent act.
Alexander Berkman and the Attentat
Among pre–World War II American anarchists, Berkman was unique: he 
was the only anarchist both to write about violence and to personally commit a 
violent deed. Most, Goldman, and other anarchists vocally promoted propagan-
da by deed, yet Berkman was the only major anarchist to enact it: he theorized 
through action rather than offering a rhetorical theory of action. Unlike Gold-
man, however, Berkman did undergo a chronological shift: early in his career 
he praised and committed violence; after a prison term, he rejected violence as 
an anarchist tactic. In 1892, he saw his attempt on Frick’s life as a viable politi-
cal strategy, because “the killing of a tyrant is in no way to be considered as the 
taking of a life.”44 Many years later, Berkman persistently condemned violence, 
noting that “the teachings of Anarchism are those of peace and harmony . . . of 
the sacredness of life.”45 By the end of his public life, Berkman claimed “An-
archism means OPPOSITION to violence, by whomever committed, [because] 
Anarchists value human life.”46 This transformation serves as an elucidating 
fulcrum, I contend reveals the representational impulse and consequently ex-
plains the fractured anarchist stance toward violence.
Berkman came of age as a radical in the wake of Haymarket. Following 
the explosion in Chicago, popular sentiment about anarchism was split. On one 
hand, anarchists were still viewed as a scourge, a menace, a threat to stable gov-
ernance. Haymarket also, however, “kindled widespread interest in anarchist 
personalities and ideas and did more to disseminate the anarchist message” than 
direct propaganda had done.47 The Haymarket bomb signaled a violent genesis 
of American anarchism’s peak, as—in a propitious twist—anarchists found in 
its aftermath a perfect example of government’s heavy-handed and misguided 
efforts to manage the populace. Neither the prosecution nor the media ever suc-
cessfully established the true source of the bomb, so the farcical trial and seem-
ingly unjust punishments resonated across the country. This relative highpoint 
of American anarchism contained multiple forms of violence: the bomb itself 
and—as anarchists argued—trials and executions that served as potent exam-
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ples of government violence (which, according to Goldman and others, caused 
events like Haymarket in the first place). Haymarket and the complex causality 
of violence it suggested, provided the backdrop for Berkman’s attempt to kill 
Frick—his attentat.
In early summer 1892, Berkman looked to the ongoing labor dispute at 
Carnegie Steel’s Homestead Works, managed by Henry Clay Frick. The Works’ 
employees were on strike, and Berkman saw a “tremendous struggle,” in which 
“the people [were] manifesting the right spirit in resisting tyranny.”48 Frick re-
sponded to the strike by requesting Pinkerton troops to protect scab workers.49 
On July 6, less than a week into the strike, these troops arrived, a fight broke 
out, and the Pinkertons opened fire. By the end of the day, seven workers were 
dead. Hearing this news in New York, Berkman was resolute: “‘Homestead!’ 
he exclaimed. ‘I must go to Homestead.’”50 He was convinced that “the psycho-
logical moment for an Attentat” had arrived, that “a blow aimed at Frick would 
. . . call the attention of the whole world to the real cause behind the Homestead 
struggle.”51 Berkman committed to kill Frick.
Seventeen days after the battle between Homestead’s workers and Frick’s 
Pinkerton strikebreakers, Berkman barged into Frick’s office with a revolver. 
He shot Frick, then his gun jammed. As a bystander tried to restrain him, Berk-
man stabbed Frick several times. Upon being subdued, Berkman felt “a strange 
feeling, as of shame,” but quickly he became angry with “this sentiment, so 
unworthy of a revolutionist.”52 Beaten into submission, Berkman was dragged 
from the room, confident that his attentat “would strike terror into the soul 
of [Frick’s] class [as] the first terrorist attack in America” and that all would 
“know that an Anarchist committed the deed.”53
In one respect, Berkman’s assault was quite successful: his few short mo-
ments in Frick’s office suddenly brought anarchism to the center of the Home-
stead dispute and generated fury against anarchists not seen since Haymarket. 
The press began a “ferocious campaign” demanding “for the police to act, to 
round up ‘the instigators, Johann Most, Emma Goldman, and their ilk.’”54 After 
Haymarket, anarchists could turn their attention to the trial, to the executions, to 
the uncertainty of the bomber’s identity—they could distance anarchism from 
the violence. At Homestead, an anarchist—and consequently anarchism—was 
undoubtedly responsible for the violence, even if that violence was a response 
to Frick’s own violent tactics (a fact lost on the public). Gone was the luxury 
of simply theorizing violence: Berkman enacted propaganda by deed, and anar-
chists were forced to respond.
Immediately after the attentat, Goldman heard Most express doubt about 
reports of Berkman’s act: “‘It is probably the usual newspaper fake. It must 
be some crank or perhaps Frick’s own man, to create sympathy for him. Frick 
knows that public opinion is against him. He needs something to turn the tide in 
his favour.’”55 Goldman was incensed by Most’s skepticism. Once he could no 
longer write off the attack as a fake, Most continued to demean Berkman and 
to distance anarchism from the attentat: “In a country where we are so poorly 
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represented and so little understood as in America, we simply cannot afford the 
luxury of assassination. . . . Berkmann [sic] . . . has stimulate[d] the most idi-
otic prejudices of idiotic Americans and thereby awakene[d] . . . the inevitable 
campaign against Anarchists.”56 He repeatedly insisted that “‘America is not 
the place for assassinations’” and that Berkman’s actions damaged the anarchist 
cause.57 The anarchist movement was divided, with many “remain[ing] loyal to 
Most and violently oppos[ing] his critics.”58 Others, like Goldman, were furi-
ous: “Most, whom I had heard scores of times call for acts of violence, who had 
gone to prison in England for his glorification of tyrannicide—Most, the in-
carnation of defiance and revolt, now deliberately repudiated the Tat!”59 These 
competing responses to Berkman’s actions, however, might be remembered dif-
ferently if it were not for Goldman’s subsequent rise to prominence and Berk-
man’s own writings.60
Goldman read in Most’s response a “change of position regarding propa-
ganda by deed,” a shift that divided anarchists “into two inimical camps.”61 His 
disavowal of the attentat, though, neither signaled a shift nor did it contradict 
other anarchist responses to violence in 1892 or the following few decades. In 
retrospect, Goldman’s defense of Berkman is the remarkable outlier. It is one 
of the only instances in which a major American anarchist claimed a violent 
act. But her desperate effort to stand by Berkman should not be interpreted 
as a wholesale embrace of violent political tactics or even an unequivocal en-
dorsement of the attack on Frick. Goldman’s defense instead is one part per-
sonal—she loved and revered Berkman—and one part residue of the anarchist 
ambivalence toward violence. Very often it appeared as character defense (and 
a simultaneous attack on Most), and, when she did defend the act, her language 
was evasive: “The heroically brave attempt of Comrade Berkmann to liberate 
human society from a beast.”62 Note the focus on the nature of the attempt itself 
(“brave”) and the act’s intent (the removal of a “beast”). Neither addressed the 
specifically anarchist nature of the act nor challenged Most’s contention that the 
attentat damaged the movement.
Elsewhere, Goldman attacked Most for not “using this act for propaganda 
purposes,” which signaled the real point of debate.63 Goldman chastised Most 
less for disavowing violence than she did for his apparent rejection of propa-
ganda by deed: he betrayed anarchism by failing to realize the propagandistic 
possibilities of Berkman’s attentat. In the internal anarchist debate around the 
attempt on Frick, the attentat’s target became irrelevant, as did the violence’s 
outcome. The disagreement between Most and Goldman reveals the relation-
ship of anarchism to violence as always a question of propaganda: how could 
anarchists—after the moment of violence—present themselves to the public in 
a way that was both meaningful and effective? Their schism thus demonstrates 
the anarchist ambivalence’s structural cause: propaganda was representation—
it offered a recognizably political vision—and thus could appear within the 
American political sphere. Violence was not and could not.
174  Dan Colson
While this debate raged, Berkman went to trial, was convicted, and was 
sentenced to 22 years in prison. His Prison Memoirs of an Anarchist mirrored 
the core of Most’s and Goldman’s dispute, suggesting the attentat should be 
measured by its propagandistic effects. Written during the fourteen years Berk-
man served (1892–1906) and published in 1912, the Prison Memoirs include a 
narrative of Berkman’s first few weeks in prison. During this period, he learned 
Frick survived the attack, realized the various ways in which his act was being 
misunderstood, and prepared for his trial, when he would have an opportunity 
to explain the reasons for the attentat. At first, Berkman experienced a sense of 
failure upon learning Frick survived: “If Frick had died, Carnegie would have 
hastened to settle with the strikers.”64 Very quickly, however, his self-policing 
image of the revolutionist forced him to reject such a simplified measure of 
success:
As if the mere death of Frick was my object! The very 
thought is impossible, insulting. . . . The insignificant reptile, 
Frick,—as if the mere man were worth a terroristic effort. I 
aimed at the many-headed hydra whose visible representa-
tive was Frick. The Homestead developments had given him 
temporary prominence. . . . That alone had made him worthy 
of the revolutionist’s attention.65
Berkman convinced himself that Frick’s survival was immaterial—ulti-
mately claiming that “the same results may occur whether Frick lives or dies”—
and that the anarchist cause might still be served through propaganda after the 
fact.66 He eliminated the possibility of any real effects from Frick’s death, thus 
making the attentat purely propaganda. Berkman’s internal struggle brought 
him to the same place as the Goldman-Most debate: could his actions be used 
for anarchist propaganda?
As the act and its immediate result became incidental, Berkman prepared 
himself to interpret the act for the outside world. Even in prison, when he tried 
to explain the meaning of his act to his working-class fellow prisoners, he was 
thwarted: “Why can’t they understand the motives that prompted my act? Their 
manner of pitying condescension is aggravating. My attempted explanation 
they evidently considered a waste of effort.”67 Out of Berkman’s initial inabil-
ity to shape others’ reaction to the attentat emerged a critical detachment of 
propaganda and the deed: “To be sure, an Attentat on a Frick is in itself splen-
did propaganda. It combines the value of example with terroristic effect. But 
very much depends upon my explanation. It offers me a rare opportunity for a 
broader agitation of our ideas. The comrades outside will also use my act for 
propaganda. The People misunderstand us . . . they must be enlightened.”68 He 
still clung to the propagandistic value of the deed itself, but admitted that the 
propaganda by word that followed the deed was crucial. Berkman realized that 
“The People”—for whom he attacked Frick—“may fail to comprehend” the 
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attack’s meaning.69 Thus, his anger toward Most arose from the negative effect 
his repudiation had on propaganda: “He will minimize the effect of my act, 
perhaps paralyze its propagandistic influence altogether.”70
Strangely, the violent actor conformed his interpretation of his own violent 
act to the anarchist discourse outside the prison, in which Most, Goldman, and 
others discussed its consequences with relative impunity. Perhaps we can ex-
plain Berkman’s attitude away as a strained response to failure, but in any case, 
he translated the deed into propaganda and thus elucidated the intersection of 
anarchist ambivalence toward violence and the theoretical construct of propa-
ganda by deed. The attentat as an act had real consequences (bullets entered 
Frick’s body; a directly oppressive and willfully violent industrialist was nearly 
killed), but the anarchist stance toward violence always theorized away from 
them. Generally, as the Goldman-Most debate revealed, the deed was always 
sublimated to propaganda. Specifically, Berkman’s attack on Frick was further 
sublimated to propaganda after the deed. Anarchists’ apparent ambivalence to-
ward violence was a by-product of this sublimation of violent deeds to propa-
ganda, which was itself an effort to negotiate the American political sphere.71
In his Prison Memoirs, Berkman effectively relegated violence to a minor 
occurrence that had no independent meaning, but was merely the genesis of an 
opportunity for propaganda, and, in this case, had not successfully educated 
workers. The work implied that violence’s role within American anarchism 
was to be determined by its propagandistic effect, which produced self-rein-
forcing, yet fundamentally undercutting, logic: only violence that advanced 
anarchism was anarchist. This circular reasoning captures the sublimation of 
violent deeds to propaganda, explains the anarchist ambivalence toward vio-
lence, and functions as an anarchist aporia: only violence that was represented 
(turned into propaganda) appeared as politics. Anarchist violence was directed 
against capitalism and the U.S. representative democracy. In this way it was 
anti-representational. As violence, it also resisted the urge toward propaganda: 
by embracing the Kropotkin’s understanding of the deed, it served as an attack 
on representation without itself becoming representation. Berkman’s attentat 
reveals the paradox facing anarchists: violence itself must become propaganda; 
the deed must be sublimated. To be politics, violence must be re-presented, to 
represent a political will. This impulse to structure all politics as some form 
of re-presentation produced the anarchist ambivalence and gestures toward 
the difficulty of positing any alternative to extant forms of U.S. government. 
One might propose changes within the nation, but even literal explosions were 
quickly circumscribed by the representational impulse. This paradox became 
clearer in the wake of McKinley’s assassination.
Leon Czolgosz and the Assassination of William McKinley
Nine years later after Berkman’s attentat, a twenty-eight-year-old, work-
ing-class Polish-American shook the United States again. First elected in 1896, 
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William McKinley is remembered mostly for his intensification of American 
imperial presence.72 While anarchists may have been angered by the expanding 
influence of American government around the world, they for the most part 
viewed him as they did every other president. He was “the chief representative 
of our modern slavery.”73 For anarchists, the position—not the person inhabit-
ing it—was most important. Like Frick, McKinley happened to be the face of 
oppression, but as president he was a far more potent symbol of U.S. democ-
racy. A strike at McKinley was a strike at American government.
On September 6, 1901, Leon Czolgosz, who had waited all day in line with 
other attendees of the Pan-American Exposition for the chance to shake hands 
with McKinley, pulled out “an Iver Johnson .32-caliber pistol, which he fired 
twice into the President.”74 The press quickly spread Czolgosz’s purported con-
fession: “‘I am an anarchist. . . . I fully understood what I was doing when I shot 
the President. I realized that I was sacrificing my life.’”75 Or, as alternately and 
more sensationally reported, “‘I am an Anarchist—a disciple of Emma Gold-
man. Her words set me on fire.”76 Czolgosz’s attack on McKinley generated “a 
wave of hysteria worse than the one after Haymarket, as the assassin’s victim 
was not a local policeman but the President of the United States.”77 Again, with 
a few gunshots, the link between anarchism and violence was reasserted. An-
archists throughout the country were arrested and anyone “expressing the least 
sympathy with Czolgosz” ran the risk of being “tarred and feathered or threat-
ened with lynching.”78 Anarchists and the popular press debated the extent of 
Czolgosz’s anti-government political beliefs and activities, but because he pro-
fessed to be an anarchist, there was a widespread attribution of his violent act 
to anarchism’s teachings and a consequent increase in anti-anarchist sentiment.
For practical reasons, anarchists tried to distance themselves from Czol-
gosz in the months following his attentat, but they went further by distancing 
Czolgosz from anarchism. More than one hundred years later, though, it seems 
clear that while Czolgosz was not intimate with the era’s prominent anarchists 
or affiliated with any anarchist organizations, he did—like many other anar-
chists—progress from socialism to anarchism, he did wish to learn more about 
the movements, its theory, and its practices, and he did act on his political be-
liefs in a violent manner. In other words, Czolgosz’s act has more in common 
with Berkman’s attentat than with Haymarket: in each case a self-professed 
anarchist enacted violence for political reasons—there was no question about 
the immediate source of the violence. These two shootings confirmed the pub-
lic image of violent anarchism.79 Both acts also required anarchists to recon-
sider and rearticulate the role of violence. McKinley’s assassination appears 
quintessentially anarchist: Czolgosz struck at the representative head of democ-
racy. Yet neither attentat was universally embraced by anarchists. Anarchists 
equivocated, disavowing the seemingly logical extension of their ideas. When 
confronted by realized violence, they shunned those who theorized through 
action rather than words. These responses illuminate the structural cause of 
anarchism’s ambivalence toward violence: Berkman and Czolgosz acted in 
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the name of anarchism, yet after their violent acts, anarchists were forced to 
navigate a political arena in which violence itself was not politics. It must be 
re-presented as propaganda.
Ironically, Most, who nine years earlier disavowed assassination as a legiti-
mate tool of American anarchism, was one of the first anarchists to be harassed 
following Czolgosz’s attack on McKinley. On the day of the shooting, Freiheit—
which Most edited—“contained an article on the general question of tyrannicide 
by the old revolutionary Carl Heinsen, then dead for a number of years.”80 The 
timing was unfortunate for Most, who a week later was arrested. Most’s arrest for 
the publication of a provocative, yet unrelated article demonstrates the immedi-
ate anti-anarchist outrage: the police sent a man to jail who already had rejected 
individual acts of political violence in the United States, which “further convinced 
him that terrorism was wrong and counterproductive.”81
Goldman and Berkman, on the other hand, were affected by Czolgosz’s 
act in a way many were not. Berkman had to respond to an attentat much like 
his own (but successful: McKinley died), while Goldman became a magnet for 
anti-anarchist vitriol after Czolgosz and the popular press implicated her in the 
assassination. Several months before the assassination, Czolgosz heard Gold-
man give a speech in which “she gave a rundown of the recent violent measures 
enacted by Anarchists, obliquely praising them.”82 Picking up on this minimal 
connection, newspapers suggested that Goldman was Czolgosz’s co-conspir-
ator and from that moment forward “her life would forever be entwined with 
Czolgosz’s act; the outside world, which may not have known her name before, 
would now associate Goldman with acts of terror.”83 There was no direct link 
between her and McKinley’s assassination, “but, even in the absence of any for-
mal establishment of guilt by association or official punishment,” she remained 
linked to McKinley’s assassination and returned to the subject in many of her 
writings over the next decade.84
Goldman very quickly began to write about and discuss Czolgosz. In some 
works, she demonstrated pity—“he was a soul in pain, a soul that could find no 
abode in this cruel world of ours”—and saw in his act evidence that government 
produced violent reaction.85 She also, however, referred to Czolgosz’s act as an 
attentat, granting it a political significance most anarchists denied.86 In 1902, 
Goldman refused to label Czolgosz’s attentat as “unanarchistic,” because “An-
archism claims the right of Defense against Invasion and Aggression of every 
shape and form and no one . . . can deny that those in Power are the Invadors 
[sic], and McKinley certainly was one of them.”87 In the same letter though, she 
claims “not [to] know whether Czolgogz [sic] was an Anarchist.”88 Here she 
repeated her theoretical stance toward defensive violence, yet stopped short of 
claiming the assassination for anarchists. Goldman, who consistently chided 
anarchists who wrote Czolgosz off as a madman, did not locate his violence as 
part of anarchism; she merely asserted that it was not contrary to anarchism. 
Later she continued to question Czolgosz’s anarchist credentials: “no evidence 
exists to indicate that Czolgosz ever called himself an Anarchist. . . . No living 
178  Dan Colson
soul ever heard Czolgosz make that statement, nor is there a single written word 
to prove that the boy ever breathed the accusations. Nothing but ignorance and 
insane hysteria.”89
Goldman accepted the political intent of Czolgosz’s act by calling it an 
attentat, but she located it in a political nonspace: neither anarchist nor unan-
archist; directed against government, yet not properly part of anti-government 
politics. Goldman’s negative definition was a magnified example of the an-
archist ambivalence toward violence. Her effort to theorize through actual 
violence relegated the act to a political void: self-defensive violence against 
government enacted the theory of violence espoused by anarchists, yet still 
was not anarchist violence. Goldman obscured, avoided, rejected the connec-
tion between anarchism and violence by subtly disavowing Czolgosz’s attentat 
because he did not represent anarchism. Czolgosz “wounded government in 
its most vital spot,” so why not embrace his act as a legitimately anarchist at-
tack on government?90 Because anarchism needed to consolidate itself to have 
any meaning within a political marketplace that privileged representation in its 
multiple forms. It must become a tangible political entity to which the populace 
could look.
From Haymarket (1886) until McKinley (1901), the anarchist ambivalence 
toward violence manifested itself through individually and collectively con-
flicting rhetoric, logic, and action. As anarchists attempted to represent the na-
ture of their political philosophy, anarchist violence served a dual, paradoxical 
role as a pillar of their theory (propaganda by deed) and as a specter haunting 
both anarchists (who distanced themselves from actual violence) and the nation 
as a whole. To have meaning within American political discourse, anarchism 
could illuminate the violence inherent to government, could preach defensive 
violence’s validity, but could not commit real violence—doing so transformed 
anarchism from politics to terrorism. Berkman’s act, and to a much greater ex-
tent, McKinley’s assassination, forced anarchism to represent itself in relation 
to concrete acts of violence, because these acts had no political meaning until 
they were represented. When pressed to represent violence, Goldman continued 
the anarchist ambivalence in an extreme manner, making Czolgosz’s act a po-
litical absence. The anarchist ambivalence must be understood, then, as the by-
product of efforts to present anarchism within an American political discourse 
that it rejected unequivocally. McKinley’s assassination heightened the need to 
represent anarchism even as it demonstrated the irreconcilability of anarchism 
with American politics/government. Berkman’s reaction to the assassination 
further confirmed the central cause of ambivalence and defined propaganda by 
deed as the only viable stance of anarchism toward violence within American 
politics.91
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Propaganda Indeed: Anarchists and the
Representational Impulse
In 1928 Berkman directly addressed the comparative value of the two 
attentats. Since he considered the matter of Frick’s survival inconsequential, 
Czolgosz’s success in killing his target was irrelevant. The measure of the act 
came from its propagandistic effects:
As to Leon, I know very well that in my prison letter I told 
you that I understood the reasons that compelled him to the 
act, but that the usefulness, socially, of the act is quite another 
matter. I hold the same opinion now. That is why we do not 
condemn any such acts, because we understand the reasons. 
But that does not mean that we cannot form our opinion about 
its social effects and usefulness. . . . [A] terroristic act should 
take in consideration the effect on the public mind—not on 
comrades. . . . So I think that my act, not because it was mine, 
but because it was one easy to understand by most people, 
was more useful than Leon’s. Though I am in general now 
not in favor of terroristic tactics . . . [t]hat acts of violence 
accomplish nothing, I do not agree at all.92
John William Ward argues Berkman here introduced “an element of prag-
matic political calculation” that he did not use to evaluate his own attentat.93 
Ward and other scholars, however, fail to recognize the nature of Berkman’s 
political calculations. In this short letter, Berkman contended that violence does 
accomplish something, then defined the criteria by which individual acts should 
be judged: the extent to which the public could understand and be affected by 
the act. McKinley’s death meant nothing in itself and the act was reduced to 
propaganda. Berkman’s apparent hypocrisy was in fact an extreme instance of 
the anarchist ambivalence toward violence—his attentat was good; Czolgosz’s 
was not—but his explanation illuminates the ambivalence’s cause:
I do not believe that this deed was terroristic; and I doubt 
whether it was educational because the social necessity was 
not manifest. . . . In Russia, where political oppression is 
popularly felt, such a deed would be of great value. But the 
scheme of political subjection is more subtle in America. And 
though McKinley was the chief representative of our modern 
slavery, he could not be considered in the light of a direct 
and immediate enemy of the people; while in an absolutism, 
the autocrat is visible and tangible. The real despotism of re-
publican institutions is far deeper, more insidious, because it 
rests on the popular delusion of self-government and inde-
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pendence. That is the subtle source of democratic tyranny, 
and, as such, it cannot be reached with a bullet.”94
Berkman’s ambivalence emerged from the unique structure of American 
governance. McKinley was only the embodied representation of oppression, 
not its cause. Under representative democracy, an attack on the representative 
head was meaningless as violence, but Berkman goes farther by evaluating the 
propagandistic value. In short, his response to Czolgosz’s attentat immediately 
discounted the violence—because in the United States, the source of govern-
ment oppression could not be touched by violence—then continued to evaluate 
all acts of violence on their ability to represent anarchism.
Berkman defined his own attentat as an attempt “to express, by my deed, 
my sentiments toward the existing system of legal oppression and industrial 
despotism . . . to give it a blow—rather morally than physically—this was the 
real purpose and signification of my act.”95 For him, the “signification” of his 
act—its “moral”—constituted its value. He evaluated Czolgosz’s act by the 
same criterion. Both cases, however, entirely eliminated violence. Berkman did 
not conceptualize the American attentat as a real attack on the embodied repre-
sentation of governance. The centrality of representation to the nation—its con-
stitutive role, by which it constructs political reality—combined with the basic 
philosophical consonance of registers of representation, required anarchism’s 
violence to be re-presented as propaganda. In other words, Berkman revealed 
that the American version of propaganda by deed was the anarchist strategy for 
making anarchism knowable within the American political discourse. It was an 
effort to navigate a political space in which the re-presentation of political will 
and positions were necessary to make anarchism appear as politics.
Propaganda—the representation of anarchism as one amongst a variety of 
competing political philosophies—met the representational impulse. Violence 
did not. Anarchist ambivalence toward violence reveals the central paradox of 
the period’s anti-government politics: to challenge the nation, which was itself 
sustained by political representation that anarchism rejected, anarchists must 
transform their politics into propaganda—into another register of representa-
tion. American democracy structurally circumscribed all political action: any 
substantive threat that did not fit within the discourse was simply not politics. 
The ambivalence of anarchists toward violence is in fact an endemic trace of the 
power of representation within U.S. political thought. Though widely feared, 
the philosophy of violence was acceptable, because it re-presented the nation’s 
evolution: calling for violence against an instantiation of government was well 
within the tradition of U.S. political life. Violence itself, though, was a funda-
mental challenge. It rejected rhetoric and threatened democracy, which explains 
its appeal to anarchists. But, in most cases, they banished it from anarchism. 
Rather than a cause-effect trajectory in which anarchists who theorized/justified 
the use of violence claimed responsibility for acts of violence, we see violence 
rejected even by those who theorized its logical necessity. This ambivalence 
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remains as a residue of anarchists’ efforts to navigate a nation in which repre-
sentation—in its various forms—was privileged; the effort to reject one register 
of representation while deploying another.
In the popular imagination, anarchism was inherently violent. But, anar-
chists’ relationship to violence was far more complex than that. They espoused 
violence, then rejected it; they equivocated and they abjured; and, most notably, 
they re-presented violence as propaganda. Ultimately, this transformation of 
violence into propaganda reveals the difficulty radical movements faced as they 
sought to make their ideologies known in the American political sphere. An-
archists rejected political representation but obviously could not avoid repre-
senting their politics if they wished to have any impact. The basic consonance, 
though, of these registers of representation—democracy’s drive to re-present 
its citizens political will and propaganda’s drive to re-present political will as 
rhetoric—produced tension, ambivalence, paradox. The complex interrelation-
ship of propaganda and deed shows us not just that anarchism’s stance toward 
violence was far from uniform, but that the impulse toward representation in 
American politics impacts even those movements that seek to reject it.
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